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S U M M A R Y
Microorganisms poorly pathogenic for man may become signiﬁcant causes of morbidity and mortality
when inadvertently inoculated into normally sterile sites. Compounding pharmacies in the USA, not
strictly overseen by the US Food and Drug Administration but by individual states, have been implicated
in a number of clusters of such events. Recognized in the fall of 2012, fungus-tainted corticosteroid
manufactured by a Massachusetts compounding pharmacy has caused the largest outbreak of this kind,
affecting 751 people with, to date, 64 deaths. The etiology of the cases of meningitis, perispinal infection
and septic arthritis was found to be, mostly, Exserohilum rostratum, a very uncommon human fungal
pathogen. Prevention of future outbreaks such as this one will require an overhaul of the control over
these industrialized compounding pharmacies and, until then, making both clinicians and patients alike
aware of this issue in order for them to make informed decisions about these products and the risk of
their use.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
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Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentive-
ness. When change is absolute there remains no being to
improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and
when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is
perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are con-
demned to repeat it.
George Santayana
The Life of Reason
2. The Exserohilum ﬁasco
Several fungal meningitis cases that occurred mid-month were
reported by the Tennessee State Department of Health to the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in September
2012. Each of the patients involved had received one or more
epidural injections of a corticosteroid. The ﬁrst cases were posted
by ProMED-mail on October 2, 2012 when there were 11 probable
cases in Tennessee and at least one in North Carolina.1 AlthoughE-mail address: larry.lutwick@med.wmich.edu.
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1201-9712  2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Socthe sentinel case in Tennessee was caused by an Aspergillus, the
primary cause of the outbreak was subsequently found to be a
mold rarely reported as a human pathogen, the phaeohyphomy-
cotic (or dematiaceous) organism, Exserohilum rostratum. October
2, 2012 was 10 years to the day that ProMED-mail reported a small
cluster of fungal meningitis cases caused by Exophiala dermatitidis,
another dematiaceous mold.2
The source of the Exserohilum was quickly found to be the
injected, pharmacy compounded corticosteroid, as it had been
with the Exophiala cluster. The tainted drug was traced back to
three lots of preservative-free methylprednisolone that had been
manufactured by the New England Compounding Center in
Framington, MA, USA. The affected lots were recalled on October
6, 2013; by that time 64 patients had been affected in nine states,
with seven deaths.3
National and state public health ofﬁcials quickly established
that the three affected lots had been apportioned to 17 676 vials
distributed to 23 states, and that 13 534 individuals had already
been injected with the drug from these lots during the 4-month
period prior to recall.4 Although many of the cases were of fungal
meningitis, subsequent manifestations of infection related to the
drug were paravertebral and epidural abscesses, with or without
meningitis, as well as joint infections of either the sacroiliac or
peripheral joints.iety for Infectious Diseases. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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with 15 deaths,5 and by November 2, 2012, there were 404 cases in
19 states with 29 deaths. In early December, 3 months or so into
the epidemic, 590 cases in 19 states with 37 deaths had occurred,6
and after a year, the totals were 751 cases, 20 states and 64 deaths.7
Among the cases, 233 (31%) were meningitis alone, 325 (43%) were
spinal or paraspinal infections alone, 33 (4%) were peripheral joint
infections alone and the rest were combination infections. Four
hundred seventeen cases were in two of the affected 20 states, 264
(35%) in Michigan and 153 (20%) in Tennessee. The case fatality
rate for non-peripheral joint infections, including all the central
nervous system or surrounding infections, was 8.5%. There may be
still more deaths from relapses or late complications of central
nervous system infection.
3. Background warnings
As noted above, a small outbreak of fungal meningitis related to a
tainted corticosteroid occurred in 2002 due to Exophiala dermatitidis.
Staes et al. have reported on healthcare-associated infections linked
to compounding pharmacies occurring over 13 years through 2012.8
Prior to the Exserohilum epidemic, they cited 11 different outbreaks
involving 207 patients with 17 deaths. The etiologies were primarily
Gram-negative bacilli and the vehicle involved mostly intravenous
or intravitreal injection, and these infections resulted in prolonged
hospitalizations, with blindness and death in some cases. In these
outbreaks, the infecting organism could be isolated from the
associated compounded drug, which had been manufactured with
poor quality control and inadequate sterility.
4. The compounding pharmacy
Before 1937 there was little federal regulatory control ensuring
the safety of new drugs. In that year, a pharmaceutical company
produced sulfanilamide using diethylene glycol as a solvent, and
called the preparation ‘Elixir Sulfanilamide’. The solvent is
poisonous to humans and other mammals, but the company’s
chief pharmacist and chemist was not aware of this. Flavoring was
added to the dissolved sulfonamide and the company marketed the
product. Although animal testing should have been routine in most
drug company operations, none were performed and there were no
regulations requiring premarket safety testing of new drugs. At
least 100 people died.9 Later on, again in a time of crisis related to
the thalidomide tragedy,10 additional legislation was passed in the
USA in 1962 to make sure that new drugs or formulations were
produced under ‘Good Manufacturing Practices’, and also that
speciﬁc sterility requirements were adhered to.11
After a hiatus of several decades, in particular beginning in the
1980s, there was a growing call for formulations that were not
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved, such as oral
suspensions, ointments, and preservative-free formulations. As a
result, an upswing of these so-called compounding pharmacies
began, regulated by state rules and regulations and not the FDA.
The FDA has struggled to regulate compounding on an ‘industrial
scale’, but has been stiﬂed by ‘First Amendment’ rights.12 Because
of this, issues of potency and sterility remain.
5. The virulence interface
As is the case for many of the fungal infections associated with
compounding pharmacy manufacturing, Exserohilum is uncom-
mon as a human pathogen and is generally considered to have low
virulence potential for man. It is found in soil and water and is a
phytopathogen of some grasses. As pointed out in the seminal
writings of Arturo Casadevall and colleagues,13–16 virulence
depends not only on the invading organism itself, but also onthe interaction of the organism and the host, which they refer to as
the ‘damage–response framework’. In the outbreak beginning in
October 2012, this basically non-human pathogen became highly
virulent by virtue of its introduction into normally sterile sites with
limited immunological responsiveness, like the central nervous
system, and the fungus was further helped by the immunosup-
pressive corticosteroid. Exserohilum is thermo-tolerant allowing it
to grow at human body temperatures. An attack rate of 751/13 534
overall, 5.5%, reﬂects a combination of factors including the size of
the inoculum and variable inocula between different lots.
6. Time’s a’wasting
Since the Exserohilum incident began, the US FDA has attempted
to gain better control of the compounding pharmacy industry.
During this time, another outbreak of fungal infections associated
with compounded pharmaceuticals has occurred; in 2013 subcuta-
neous abscesses containing mixed fungal and bacterial organisms
were reported in at least 24 people in four states, linked to a
compounded corticosteroid.17 Additionally, another cluster of
endophthalmitis was reported from a compounded drug.18
7. Conclusion
It is 77 years since the sulfanilamide disaster precipitated the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act aimed at protecting the American
public from such incidents. Without aggressive legislation to
ensure that the compounding pharmacy industry can produce
medications with the expected sterility and potency, over- and
underdosing illnesses, blindness, and deaths will continue to occur.
This is particularly true of ‘industrialized’ compounders, which
manufacture large quantities of supposedly sterile medications
that are distributed widely.
As stated by Mikosz et al. in a report on fungal endophthalmitis
linked to compounded products, ‘‘Clinicians should be aware that
the availability of a compounded medication in the United States is
not a guarantee of its quality or of FDA approval. Disclosure of a
medication’s FDA approval status should be encouraged at all
stages of purchase and use. This information might enable
clinicians to make informed decisions about the medications they
purchase for patient use and to educate patients about the status of
medications to which they are exposed. Maintenance of the safety
and integrity of sterile compounded drugs in the United States
demands a thorough review and improvement of compounding
pharmacy regulatory practices.’’19
Conﬂict of interest: None.
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